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Moreover, the practical realities on the ground often result in one sovereign entity exercising more or less power than the law on the books might otherwise suggest. 3 In the criminal law context, tribal-state-federal jurisdiction generally rests on the three premises: (1) tribes retain inherent authority to prosecute American Indians, regardless of an individual's precise tribal affiliation; (2) a mix of federal statutes authorize federal prosecution of some crimes that occur within Indian country; and (3) states lack authority to prosecute Indian country crimes absent express federal authorization of state authority. 4 These foundations of Federal Indian law have resulted in the understanding that Indian country crimes are a matter of tribal and federal concern.
5 States only expend resources and exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indian country crimes when a state-specific allocation of jurisdiction to the state warrants state involvement. 6 States, particularly in this current economic downtown, have little incentive to expend limited resources on criminal prosecutions inside Indian country-and conceptually outside the traditional definition of state authority-unless there is a jurisdictional gap. Gaps have historically occurred when, as a practical reality, neither the federal government, nor the tribal government is actively providing law enforcement and consistent prosecution. 7 The history of tribal-state-federal relations within the state of Kansas has produced a unique state-specific scenario for apportioning criminal jurisdiction between the three sovereigns. Kansas 7. See, e.g., Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 106-07 (discussing that the legislative history of the Kansas Act noted that, in practice, Kansas exercised jurisdiction over all offences committed on Indian reservations involving Indians because such offenses otherwise went unpunished).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006) (defining "Indian country" as (a) all land within the limits of any reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished).
sovereigns: the United States, 9 the state of Kansas, 10 and one of the four federally recognized tribes located within the exterior boundaries of the state of Kansas 11 -Prairie Band Potawatomi, Kickapoo Tribes in Kansas, Sac and Fox Nation, or the Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Missouri. 12 Although the unique Kansas scenario came about because of a perceived jurisdictional gap in the 1930s, the modern realities of tribalstate-federal relations in Kansas, particularly in light of the development and growth of tribal courts, no longer support the continued need for multijurisdictional criminal coverage. As such, this Article questions the continued viability of the Kansas Act federal legislation, which extended Indian country criminal jurisdiction to the state of Kansas, while leaving unimpaired preexisting tribal and federal jurisdiction over the same offenses. This Article concludes with recommendations for legislative reform and the consideration of intergovernmental agreements with an eye toward providing a solution that respects modern policies of tribal self-determination, protects the financial resources and judicial economy of state and tribal courts, and protects the rights of defendants who may be subject to multiple prosecutions for the same offense.
II. HISTORY OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
At the time of Kansas' admission to the federal union in 1861, tribes throughout the United States exercised criminal jurisdiction within their territories. 13 Although federal law first purported to extend federal jurisdiction over non-Indians committing offenses against Indians in the 1790s, 14 the federal statutory scheme as it existed in 1861, expressly disavowed federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian-on-Indian crimes within Indian country. 15 It was also well-established that states had no authority for extending their laws into tribal territories. 16 Even as late as 1883, the United States Supreme Court validated the continuance of exclusive tribal jurisdiction over intratribal crimes, despite attempts by federal officials to extend federal criminal laws into Indian country. 17 In 1885, with the passage of the Major Crimes Act (MCA), 18 Congress extended federal criminal jurisdiction into Indian country, providing for the first time federal prosecutorial power over Indians independent of whether the victim of the crime be Indian or non-Indian. 19 The MCA provided for federal prosecution over certain crimes but did not purport to authorize state jurisdiction. 20 Instead, the passage of the MCA in concert with the previous federal statutory scheme of federal jurisdiction over interracial crimes set up a system whereby Indian country crimes would be prosecuted by federal or tribal officials, or both. Numerous cases within the federal system uphold the right of the tribe and the right of the federal government to prosecute an individual, without double jeopardy concerns, based on the fact that both sovereigns are exercising independent sovereign powers. 21 During this time period, the only instances in which states were authorized to exercise criminal jurisdiction inside Indian country were those offenses in which both the perpetrator and the victim were nonIndian. 22 State jurisdiction in those instances was judicially sanctioned 14 on the basis of the Equal Footing Doctrine of the United States Constitution. 23 This doctrine has been applied uniformly to all states to acknowledge state criminal jurisdiction, even where state constitutions or enabling acts contain waivers which disavow that the state comes into the union with any jurisdiction over Indian country therein. 24 Outside of the context of a non-Indian on non-Indian crime, before the 1940s there was no specific authorization under law for Kansas state or county officials to play a role in criminal jurisdiction stemming from Indian country crimes. Under what appeared to be a practice of convenience, rather than one specified in law, the state of Kansas, rather than federal authorities, prosecuted offenses occurring between Indians in Indian country. 32 This was done even when the conduct involved offenses under the Major Crimes Act.
33
Continuation of this practice appeared to be facing scrutiny, however. The legislative report referenced a challenge to state prosecution of criminal acts on reservations in Kansas. 34 The memorandum included in the report opined that the state actually had no authority to exercise such jurisdiction. 35 One argument in support of the Kansas Act claimed that passage of the Act would "merely confirm a relationship which the State has willingly assumed, which the Indians have willingly accepted, and which has produced successful results, over a considerable period of years."
36
Another reason reported to Congress in support of the Kansas Act related to the complexity of criminal jurisdiction in "Indian country." 37 The intricacy of this jurisdictional framework resulted largely from the disposition of allotment and trust lands in Kansas. The remaining unrestricted 80,063 acres were reported to be under state, rather than federal jurisdiction. 39 When an offense was committed on a reservation, assertion of federal criminal jurisdiction over the act could occur only after determining that the offense occurred on trust land rather than unrestricted land. 40 The report reasoned that due to the "checkerboard" nature of the trust lands, criminal acts between Indians on land within a reservation that did not constitute trust land were already properly under Kansas state jurisdiction. 41 The report went on to assert that the burden of making this determination was onerous and could be eliminated by passing general criminal jurisdiction to the state. The language preventing application of "section 548 of title 18" and sections "217 and 218 of title 25" in Kansas, if enacted, would have prevented federal prosecution and punishment of the major crimes enumerated under federal law in Indian country in the state. 63 It would also have prevented the federal government from asserting authority under the General Crimes Act. identical bill in the United States Senate. 65 Both bills were referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs.
66
Correspondence during and shortly after this time reinforce that a transfer of jurisdiction to state authorities, rather than concurrent jurisdiction, was the objective of the 1938 bill. John DeRoin, Chairman of the Iowa Tribal Executive Committee wrote to Senator Capper, making this point while asking that the senator introduce a version of the House bill in the Senate: "As matters now stand, there are certain cases handled in State Court and the Indians generally would prefer to be under the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the State Courts and on an equality with white people in this regard." 67 A letter from Superintendent Bruce to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs reiterated that the intent was the transfer of jurisdiction but noted that the U.S. Attorney seemed opposed. In fact, it appeared that the U.S. Attorney for Kansas was preparing to follow up on his plan to assert jurisdiction over all cases that could legally be brought in federal court. 68 In the letter, Bruce noted that state authorities had been handling criminal cases occurring on reservations and that the bill would "merely confirm the jurisdiction which the state has willingly assumed over a long period of years, without any questions arising until now." 69 He also reiterated that all four tribes in Kansas supported this bill. 68. Letter from H.E. Bruce, Superintendent, Potawatomi Agency, to Comm'r of Indian Affairs (Mar. 9, 1938) (on file with the National Archives at Kansas City).
I talked with the U.S. Attorney this week but he does not seem inclined to take the matter up further with the Department of Justice headquarters in Washington. In substance, his position seems to be that he will assume jurisdiction over any case that apparently properly belongs in Federal Court until such time as existing law is changed. Perhaps the Office may wish to recommend to the Attorney General that the Department of Justice ask the U.S. Attorney to permit all cases to be handled in state courts as heretofore, in accordance with the apparent wish of the Indians, until such time as Congress has acted upon the bill which Congressman Lambertson probably has introduced by now has been enacted into law. In the face of opposition from the Department of Justice, this first version of the legislation was ultimately defeated. 71 By the end of the calendar year, however, plans were made to introduce a slightly altered version of the bill in the next legislative session. Rather than seek a total transfer of jurisdiction, the next legislative effort sought to have concurrent-not exclusive-jurisdiction over crimes occurring in Indian country in Kansas extend to state authorities.
72 Superintendent Bruce believed this approach would secure Department of Justice approval.
73
Groundwork to demonstrate support for the initiative once again involved tribal nations in Kansas enacting resolutions in favor of the bill. However, resolutions appeared to come about through a slightly different mechanism this time around. Rather than the tribes adopting resolutions worded in a way organically developed by each tribe, identical resolutions were authorized by three tribes. Materials in the National Archives provide some explanation in that they include a fill-in-theblank copy of a resolution. Significantly, these resolutions sought legislation providing concurrent jurisdiction to Kansas rather than a transfer of criminal jurisdiction. 76 It is also significant that there is no corresponding resolution in the archived materials from Potawatomi Nation. 77 The materials in the National Archives pertaining to this second bill document support from only three out of the four tribes in Kansas. At that point in the historical record, there was no evidence of opposition on the part of Potawatomi Nation, only a failure to act on the matter one way or the other.
78
Undated model resolution (on file with the National Archives at Kansas City). Signature lines for the Secretary and Chairman followed the text. Id. The word "concurrent" is a handwritten edit to one copy of the model resolution in the archived materials. See id. Interestingly, the archived materials also contain an undated handwritten note of unknown authorship. The note reads:
After one tribe adopts this or a similar resolution, the others might "endorse the resolution adopted by the ____ tribe on _____ __ 1938, to the effect that," etc.," [sic] so the resolutions will not all read exactly the same with no explanation of how they happened to be just the same. The resolution could be preceded by a number of Whereas-es [sic] setting forth the reasons for the resolution. Undated handwritten note (on file with the National Archives at Kansas City). Apparently, the approach proposed in this note was not adopted. Instead, three resolutions based upon the model, without explicit explanation of how or why they read exactly the same, were adopted. See also Letter from H.E. Bruce, supra note 71 ("A friend in the Indian Office has drafted a new proposed Bill to provide for the surrender of concurrent jurisdiction and I am inclosing copies of resolutions passed by the Councils of the Kickapoo, Iowa, and Sac & Fox Tribes, endorsing this bill. You will note that this action of all three Tribes was unanimous.").
75 Even though these objections from the Potawatomi Business Council preceded issuance of the report from the Committee on Indian Affairs, no mention of Potawatomi's objection is noted in the Committee's report on the bill or anywhere else in the legislative history. Indeed, a major reason recited in support of the legislative history is that all four tribes in Kansas were in favor of the legislation. 85 Not only was there a lack of unanimity among the four tribes, but when looking at tribal populations, the three tribes that approved of the bill did not even constitute a majority of the Native people in Kansas. A letter from the Potawatomi Chairman to Representative Rogers stated: "The Business Committee of the Prairie Band Potawatomi tribe of Indians represents eleven-hundred of the sixteen-hundred Indians of Kansas . . . I beg to urge all you can in your power to stop this House Resolution 3048."
86 Thus, representatives of a majority of Indians in Kansas opposed the bill that became the Kansas Act. 
C. The Kansas Act Evolves to Its Final Form
After Burlew's proposed wording was ultimately adopted and became the language of the bill's final form.
90
Changing the functional language from "concurrent jurisdiction is hereby relinquished to the State of Kansas to prosecute Indians and others for offenses by or against Indians or others, committed on Indian reservations in Kansas," to "jurisdiction is hereby conferred on the State of Kansas over offenses committed by or against Indians on Indians reservations" 91 altered the reach of the Act. The plain language of relinquishing concurrent jurisdiction would have bestowed on Kansas authority to prosecute only those offenses addressed by federal law. The The first, and arguably the most frequently cited, was the then-existing jurisdictional gap experienced in some tribal communities due to the lack of tribal judicial systems. 99 This jurisdictional gap led to the general perception that tribal communities, lacking their own formal judicial systems, were unable to maintain law and order on their own. 100 This was the underpinning for the transfer of legal authority from the federal government to those "mandatory" Public Law 280 states. 101 Secondly, Public Law 280's somewhat less frequently stated goal was to gradually shift the financial burden of prosecuting crimes in Indian Country to the states 102 and, in doing so, to support the federal government's policy of assimilating Indian tribes and Indian people.
103
This policy encouraged federal actions that supported mechanisms by which Indian people would be subsumed into the larger white society. According to Cohen, the critics of Indian reorganization attacked it on two basic fronts. 107 The first of those to criticize the policy were those that had economic interest in Indian lands and resources and believed that Indian Reorganization would undermine their interest.
108
The second entity to criticize Indian reorganization policies was the federal government itself and, in particular, members of Congress who were unsatisfied with the Bureau of Indian Affairs and their oversight of 98 Indian affairs, as well as the costly expenditures still being incurred to run the department. 109 The lack of political will, along with the lack of resources and personnel as a result of the war in Europe, supported the sense of urgency for termination and assimilation of Indian tribes and Indian people. 110 In spite of this viewpoint, there was recognition that Indian tribes were not yet in a position "to be turned loose" 111 and that there remained obligations as yet unfulfilled by the federal government. 
The Kansas Act Foreshadows Federal Action
With this historic context in mind, it is telling that the stated purpose of the Kansas Act foreshadows that of Public Law 280. In support of the Kansas Act, the legislative history asserts that not only did Kansas tribes lack a comprehensive code required to maintain law and order but also that they lacked a tribal court in which to enforce them. 113 Additionally, the legislative history acknowledges that although federal statutes were applicable to Kansas tribes, there were jurisdictional gaps that needed to be addressed as a result of the lack of functioning tribal court systems. 114 However, unlike those tribes affected in mandatory Public Law 280 states, the four Kansas tribes initially supported the transfer of criminal jurisdiction to the state. 115 This is in marked contrast to what occurred upon the passage of Public Law 280, where affected tribes had no choice as to when states could assume jurisdiction on their reservations. 116 The lack of tribal consent created controversy from the beginning due not only to the one-sided nature of the process but also because Public Law 280 clearly rejected principals of tribal self-determination and sovereignty. 117 States covered by Public Law 280 that were required to assume jurisdiction over tribal communities also had issues with the legislation because they had to assume jurisdiction but were not funded by the federal government to do so. While there are some similarities between Public Law 280 and the Kansas Act, there remain significant and important differences. For instance, Public Law 280 extends state criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations within those named states and, in doing so, eliminates the criminal jurisdiction formally held by the federal government.
119 Most importantly, however, is that it did not eliminate tribal jurisdiction.
120
In contrast, the Kansas Act provides criminal jurisdiction to the state, 121 but the federal government retains statutory authority to prosecute major crimes and interracial crimes.
122 This is an important distinction because the federal government remains obligated to assert jurisdiction over serious "offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations."
123 Moreover, the fact that the federal government did not relinquish its entire authority to the state of Kansas means that the federal government still provides financial and other support to Kansas tribes to support tribal self-determination. 124 When the federal government relinquished its authority to those specific Public Law 280 states, it also stopped providing financial support to tribes to support tribal self-governance. 125 This was an intended outcome in the relinquishment of federal jurisdiction and one that has had lasting impact on tribes in Public Law 280 states; specifically, the lack of federal funding has only further delayed the development of tribal justice systems. 128 Concerns raised by tribes in Public Law 280 states focused on the lack of effective law enforcement on reservations, as well as the infringement of tribal sovereignty.
129
The report ultimately determined that it was most important to continue to collect important policing data in affected states with the possibility of creating more effective federal policies, such as "affirming concurrent tribal jurisdiction, encouraging voluntary interjurisdictional arrangements . . . or authorizing tribally initiated retrocession" of Public Law 280. 130 Because criminal jurisdiction as a result of the Kansas Act falls somewhere in between the historic criminal jurisdiction framework in non-Public Law 280 states and the relinquishment of federal authority envisioned as a result of Public Law 280, the state of Kansas and Kansas tribes have both similar and unique concerns. In spite of those differences, it is important to make a similar determination as to the ongoing necessity of the Kansas Act. This is especially true in light of the fact that those circumstances that precipitated the Kansas Act to begin with are no longer relevant in the twenty-first century. Kansas tribes now have tribal court systems that have evolved to address issues of law and order occurring on their respective reservations. There is no reason to have continued state interference with the administration of that justice. As such, the principle reason articulated in the legislation is moot. Furthermore, rather than being in a policy period that supports the termination of tribes, we are now in a policy period that recognizes the need for tribal sovereignty and self-determination. 131 It is hard to reconcile that with the effects of the Kansas Act on the four tribal nations in Kansas.
E. Do the Reasons that Gave Rise to the Kansas Act Still Exist?
In addition to the claim that all Indian tribes in Kansas supported the legislation, another key reason proffered for passage of the Kansas Act was that none of the Indian nations in Kansas operated tribal courts. Without tribal courts to adjudicate crimes falling outside the reach of the 280 states; (2) determine the quality of law enforcement in those states; (3) evaluate federal "criminal justice funding and services;" (4) "evaluate retrocession, concurrent jurisdiction and cooperative agreement as options to alleviate" policing problems; and (5) 133 Therefore, the concern that a criminal act "universally decreed wrongful . . . may escape punishment"
134 is no longer a concern requiring the intervention of Kansas state authorities. Simply put, assertion of state criminal jurisdiction is not necessary to fill a vacuum of lawlessness.
Because the key reasons for passing the Kansas Act no longer exist, it is appropriate to ask whether the time for the Kansas Act has passed. Does the existence of the Kansas Act undercut modern principles of tribal sovereignty?
IV. EFFECT OF KANSAS ACT ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS IN INDIAN COUNTRY WITHIN THE STATE OF KANSAS

A. A Description of Tribal-State-Federal Jurisdiction in Kansas
Immediately following the enactment of the Kansas Act, it is likely that very little changed within tribal-state-federal jurisdiction in Kansas. It is documented that, although lacking in legal authority to do so, at least some county officials were actively prosecuting individuals for Indian country crimes in Kansas state courts beyond the non-Indian on nonIndian crimes that would have been the limitation on state authority at the time. 135 This was likely the case from the 1940s into the 1980s, when the four tribes in Kansas began revitalizing tribal governments and exercising inherent powers that had remained dormant for decades 
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because of crippling federal policies against tribal self-governance and an overall lack of tribal governments. Today, all four tribes have a functioning tribal court system, often with resources that match comparable county court allocations. 136 All four tribes employ, either independently or with Bureau of Indian Affairs funding, tribal police departments. 137 The tribal court systems exercise an array of jurisdiction from traffic matters to criminal and civil dockets akin to state counterparts, including child support enforcement, contract disputes, employee appeals, and the full range of criminal jurisdiction. 138 As a matter of federal law, tribes are not recognized as having the authority to prosecute non-Indians following the Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe decision of the United States Supreme Court in 1978. 139 As such, tribal criminal prosecutions are limited to American Indian individuals, either members or citizens of the prosecuting tribe, or members or citizens of another federally recognized tribe. 140 Tribal sentencing power has also been limited by federal legislation and currently stands for most offenses at a maximum one-year sentence and $5000 fine or, in limited circumstances, a three-year sentence and $15,000 fine. 141 Although the bulk of tribal criminal cases prosecuted within the Kansas tribes involve minor offenses that would be classified as misdemeanors under corresponding state law, serious violent offenses do occur and the tribes have recently exercised jurisdiction over such matters that would warrant major crimes status under the federal model or felony status under the state model. 
B. Unintended Consequences-Multiple Prosecutions
Evolution of language in the first draft of the Kansas Act in 1938 to its final enacted form dramatically changed the effect of the law. The first version sought to transfer authority to prosecute offenses committed by Indians in Indian country from the federal government to state authority. 143 Had that draft become law, the U.S. Attorney could no longer have prosecuted crimes occurring on reservations in Kansas. However, as passed, the Kansas Act extends, rather than transfers, authority to prosecute to the state, while at the same time retaining within the federal authority the ability to prosecute offenses under federal law. As such, a single action constituting a crime under state law and federal law may be prosecuted by both entities. Doing so does not constitute double jeopardy because state government and federal government are separate sovereigns. 144 Similarly, a single act constituting an offense under a tribal criminal code and federal law is subject to prosecution by both sovereigns. 145 While this was not contemplated as an issue when the Kansas Act was conceived, as discussed above, the establishment of tribal courts in all four Native nations in Kansas makes this more than just a theoretical possibility. Even less theoretical are circumstances in which a single act constitutes a crime under tribal law and state law. Since tribal nations and the state of Kansas are each sovereign entities, dual prosecutions under state and tribal law do not constitute double jeopardy either. recognized tribes unique in that they alone face the possibility of triple prosecution for a single act. 147 While the authors of this Article are not aware of any instance in which a person faced triple prosecution for a single act, the possibility exists under the law.
More immediate is the risk that, under the Kansas Act, a Native person will be the subject of tribal and state prosecutions for an act that that occurs on Indian lands in Kansas. Statistics on the frequency of dual prosecutions are not readily available, 148 however, there is ample anecdotal evidence that this is not a mere theoretical possibility. For example, the Washburn Law Clinic served as counsel for a Native American client charged with offenses under a tribal criminal code.
149
While facing charges in tribal court, the client also faced charges for the same act in state court. Initially, the tribal prosecutor on the case indicated he would consult with the state prosecutor to see if the state would consider deferring prosecution to tribal authorities. The tribal prosecutor stated that if he could not dissuade state authorities, he would probably not pursue charges in tribal court. But when attempts to get the state to decline prosecution failed, the tribal prosecutor felt the charges were serious enough and affected the fabric of the community such that the tribe needed to be involved in seeking justice. He ultimately initiated prosecution in tribal court. When both prosecutions had concluded, the client stood convicted of a felony in state court and offenses in tribal court. Indeed, had the federal government chosen to step in, the accusations would have qualified for prosecution under the federal Major Crimes Act, resulting in a triple prosecution. This example is not the only instance of dual prosecutions occurring due to the Kansas Act.
Native people in Kansas have expressed surprise and concern that a single act on a reservation can result in multiple prosecutions. 150 Recently, some tribal and state prosecutors have addressed that concern by taking steps to prevent dual prosecutions. For example, there is a 147. But see Duma, supra note 38 (arguing that since the state of Kansas is granted jurisdiction on Indian lands by the federal government under the Kansas Act, dual prosecution by federal and state governments for a single act on a reservation would violate double jeopardy prohibitions because the authority to prosecute for both sovereigns originates from the federal government).
148. Attempts to obtain statistics from tribal courts and state courts regarding the incidence of dual prosecutions were unsuccessful.
149. To protect privacy of the Clinic client, details about the charges and the courts in which the offenses were filed are omitted from this discussion. This information comes from a case supervised by co-author John Francis, Professor of Law and Director of Law Clinic at Washburn University School of Law.
150. This sentiment has been expressed to members of Washburn University Law Clinic working with co-authors Professors John Francis and Aliza Organick. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 memorandum of agreement between Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation and the Jackson County prosecutor that they will avoid having both entities prosecute Native people for a single act. 151 While this agreement is effective relief from the risk of dual prosecutions, it is only a band-aid fix to the problem. A change in policy or philosophy by administrators of either entity could end the agreement, restoring the risk of multiple prosecutions
C. Sentencing Implications
As previously discussed, there are a host of issues that arise when a person faces prosecution for the same behavior both in tribal court and in state court, as is the case with the Kansas Act. These double, and potentially triple, prosecutions have sentencing ramifications on the state and federal levels.
152 Kansas state sentencing laws clearly allow for tribal convictions to contribute to an offender's criminal history.
153
Federal jurisdiction also adds to this patchwork of prosecutions, making members of federally recognized Tribal Nations particularly vulnerable to enhanced federal penalties. Consultation. The parties are working openly and cooperatively with each other with the goal and intent to provide the County and the Nation the mutual benefit of ensuring that their respective communities are fully and sufficiently protected by law enforcement and that the criminal offender is duly prosecuted in one jurisdiction. In the effort to avoid the potential situation where a PBPN tribal member may be subject to a criminal prosecution in three jurisdictions (Tribal, State, and Federal.), the parties will consult with each other to efficiently utilize their respective resources while at the same time ensuring that proper criminal prosecution occurs in an appropriate jurisdiction. lived with his children and his wife, a member of the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe, on the Spirit Lake Reservation in North Dakota. 156 Following an altercation with a federal officer on the Spirit Lake Reservation, Lara was prosecuted and convicted in Spirit Lake Tribal Court for "'violence to a policeman.'" 157 Lara was subsequently charged with assaulting a federal officer in the Federal District Court for the District of North Dakota. 158 The Supreme Court recognized the federal prosecution would normally have raised double jeopardy problems because the "[k]ey elements of [the] federal crime mirror[ed] elements of the tribal crime of 'violence to a policeman.'" 159 However, the Court reasoned that Lara's double jeopardy claim depended on whether the Tribe's power to punish nonmember Indian offenders was based on "inherent tribal sovereignty" or "delegated federal authority."
160 Therefore, the Court had to consider the constitutionality of 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), through which Congress sought to "enlarg[e] the tribes' own 'powers of self-government' to include 'the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians,' including nonmembers." 161 In determining the constitutionality of 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) and, consequently, the source of a tribe's jurisdiction over "nonmember Indians," the Supreme Court discussed the fluctuating history of Federal Indian Policy, recounting Congress's move from removal, to assimilation and the break-up of tribal lands, to termination, and then to selfdetermination. 162 This continual change in policy led the Court to conclude that there is a great need for the Constitution to be interpreted to authorize Congress "to enact legislation that both restricts and, in turn, relaxes those restrictions on tribal sovereign authority."
163 Therefore, the Court resolved that, in the case of 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), Congress's decision to "rela[x] restrictions on the bounds of the inherent tribal authority that the United States recognizes" is constitutionally permissible. 164 The Court dismissed the additional due process and equal protection claims raised by Lara and ultimately decided that the Constitution allows Congress to authorize tribes to prosecute nonmember Indians as a matter of the tribe's inherent authority.
165
As such, in prosecuting Lara, the Spirit Lake Tribe was acting as a distinct sovereign, and thus the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit subsequent federal prosecution for the separate federal offense. 166 This case means that offenders who are members of a federally recognized tribe could conceivably be prosecuted in a tribal, state, and federal court for the same behavior, while a non-Indian would only be subject to state and federal jurisdiction. 167 Certainly, there is an argument to be made for showing respect for tribal court convictions by giving them the same weight in federal sentencing that state court convictions enjoy. 168 However, this desire is in tension with the current system that potentially has a disproportionate sentencing impact on members of Indian Tribes and Nations. 169 Given the increased likelihood of members of Indian Tribes and Nations to be subject to prosecution by tribal, state, and federal authorities, "Native Americans who come into contact with the criminal justice system are more likely to be charged, and sentenced, under federal law than the average American." 170 Therefore, the federal sentencing implications are particularly important when discussing this group of offenders. There are several ways in which prior tribal prosecutions can figure into federal sentencing, from statements made in tribal court proceedings to the fact that convictions and sentences were imposed in tribal court. In the Tenth Circuit case United States v. Denetclaw, the court upheld the use of a defendant's tribal court pleas to impeach his testimony at the federal trial arising from the same assault incidents.
171
The circuit court then affirmed the sentencing district court's use of that perjurious testimony to enhance the defendant's sentence based on obstruction of justice. federal convictions can be greatly affected by just the fact that previous tribal and state sentences exist-whether those previous convictions were based on the same behavior as the federal offense or on completely different offenses that occurred years earlier.
173
Although the Federal Sentencing Guidelines exclude certain types of sentences from counting as prior sentences, a host of tribal, state, and federal adjudications can enhance an offender's criminal history score.
174
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been advisory since 2005; however, federal district judges must still calculate and consider the applicable Guidelines range when sentencing an offender.
175
The Guidelines contain several factors relevant to an offender's proper sentence, including criminal history, as well as specifics about the offense, which all correlate to points that are ultimately used to find a sentencing range on a grid. In determining an offender's criminal history, section 4A1.1 of the Guidelines calls for a sentencing court to add a certain amount of points to an offender's criminal history calculation based on the length of prior sentences imposed, including state sentences. (1) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines; (2) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission; (3) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; (4) the need to provide restitution to victims; and (5) the requirement to impose sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and effectively provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training and medical care. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
176. For instance, section 4A1.1 directs sentencing courts to "[a]dd 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month" and to "[a]dd 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days," etc. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1. The district court determined that the Guidelines did not adequately capture the defendant's criminal history, and therefore the court increased the applicable criminal history based in part on Harlan's prior tribal court convictions.
180
This augmented Harlan's criminal history category from I to III, which increased the initial Guidelines range of fifty-one to sixty-three months imprisonment to a range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months.
181 Ultimately, Harlan was sentenced to seventy-two months of imprisonment, nine months longer than what would have been applicable under the then-mandatory Guidelines had criminal history category I been applied. 182 On appeal, the Eight Circuit relied on section 4A1.3(a) in upholding the sentence determination and explained that "the sentencing court should be guided, at least in part, by the criminal history category which would have applied had the uncounted prior convictions been computed." 183 Similarly, in United States v. Sitting Bear, the Eight Circuit upheld the consideration of prior tribal convictions. 184 In that case, parents Sitting Bear and Marshall were convicted of second degree murder and aiding and abetting second degree murder, respectively, for the beating death of their four-year-old son. 185 The circuit court found it reasonable for the district court to have considered Marshall's prior child neglect convictions in tribal court in determining her ultimate sentence for the federal offense.
186
What is interesting about Sitting Bear is that the sentences for the defendants were imposed after the Supreme Court demoted the Guidelines to advisory status in United States v. Booker. Therefore, although the sentencing court was required to calculate and determine the applicable Guidelines range, which was 151 to 188 months of imprisonment in Marshall's case, 188 the sentencing court was free to depart from the range if it found that a Guidelines sentence would not satisfy the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
189
Once the sentencing court in Sitting Bear decided that the Guidelines range would not provide adequate punishment considering Marshall's prior abusive behavior, the court did not have to determine a numerical value to place on the prior tribal convictions being incorporated into the criminal history category, as the sentencing court had to do in Harlan. Instead, the court was free to fashion a sentence that it determined reflected the section 3553(a) sentencing factors, without indicating how much weight it was putting on those prior tribal convictions. 190 In Marshall's case, the court determined that a sentence of 228 months adequately reflected the severity of her offense and criminal history. 191 Apparently, post-Booker, sentencing courts have much more latitude in how much emphasis they may put on prior tribal convictions.
Of course, one could argue that this tribal conviction penalty only applies to prior tribal convictions that are unrelated to the instant federal offense for which a defendant is being sentenced. The term "prior sentence" is defined by the Guidelines as "any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense." 192 Therefore, behavior that constitutes the bases for both a prior state or tribal sentence and the instant federal sentencing should not be double (or triple) counted as a prior sentence for criminal history purposes. However, circuit courts have disagreed on how to decipher when they will not consider conduct punished by another jurisdiction as part of the instant federal offense. For instance, the Tenth Circuit has affirmed the use of a defendant's state sentence based on aiding and abetting a methamphetamine manufacturing operation as a prior conviction in the federal sentencing for being a felon in possession of a firearm, even though the firearm was found when the defendant was arrested for the state offense.
193 By contrast, the Third Circuit has explicitly rejected the severability test employed by the Tenth Circuit and has instead remanded a case for resentencing where a defendant's criminal history was increased based on a state involuntary manslaughter sentence using a gun that was the basis of the instant federal sentencing for being a felon in possession of a firearm. 194 Therefore, it is quite conceivable that conduct that leads to prosecution by tribal, state, and federal authorities may result in an enhanced criminal history score for federal sentencing purposes. And in the current advisory Guidelines, it is impossible to know how much of an impact those prior offenses will have on a federal sentencing determination. Consequently, the Kansas Act opens the door for serious sentencing consequences for offenders who are Indian and subject to tribal, state, and federal concurrent jurisdiction.
D. Practical Consequences of the Act
At present, all four tribes within the state of Kansas operate a tribal court system exercising both civil and criminal jurisdiction. 195 The largest of the four, the Prairie Band Potawatomi Tribe, maintains a judiciary consisting of a district court judge, two associate district court judges, a special district court judge, three court of appeals justices, a separate employment dispute tribunal, a healing to wellness court, and a peacemaker's circle for alternative dispute resolution. 196 The annual judicial budget is $237,848. 197 The tribe hires a prosecutor and four public defenders on a contract basis. 198 All judges, prosecutors, and public defenders are law-trained members of state bar associations, predominately the Kansas Bar. 199 The tribe also maintains a police force. 200 The Potawatomi Reservation consists of 77,400 acres within Jackson County, Kansas. 201 The tribal court may exercise jurisdiction over individual Indians when the crime occurs within the reservation boundary and the substantive law is defined by tribal legislation. 202 The state court may exercise jurisdiction over the same individual, with the substantive law defined by state legislation. 203 The federal court may exercise jurisdiction over the same individual, with the substantive law defined by federal legislation. 204 For example, assume a robbery takes place on the reservation. The assailant and victim are both tribal members-citizens of the Prairie Band Potawatomi. Law enforcement officers, both tribal and state police dispatches, are alerted to the activity when the victim phones 911 emergency services. Both tribal and state police officers arrive at the scene to begin their independent investigations. Two days later, the assailant is arrested by tribal police and taken from his home, on the reservation, to the Jackson County Jail, where the tribe pays contract fees to Jackson County to house the suspect pending arraignment because the tribe does not maintain a tribal detention facility.
The tribal prosecutor files charges in tribal district court under section 15-2-41 of the Prairie Band Potawatomi Code. 205 The county prosecutor files charges in state district court under section 21-5420 of the Kansas Statutes. 206 In each court, the defendant, if unable to afford an attorney, will receive court appointed counsel. In each court, the defendant is entitled to a jury trial upon request. Each court is empowered to impose a sentence upon conviction. Even if only two jurisdictions, tribal and state, actively pursue prosecution, as a practical reality, economic and judicial efficiency and fundamental fairness questions abound. Is this necessary to address lawless on the reservation? If there once was a climate of lawlessness on the reservations, has that climate been eliminated by the presence of tribal police forces and tribal courts? This is particularly true in times of economic hardships for state and tribal governments as well as budget uncertainty on the federal level. The state of Kansas has instituted mandatory furloughs for state courts and judicial resources have been severely reduced.
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V. PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER REFORM As it currently stands, the state of Kansas and the tribes within the state are expending scarce financial resources to duplicate prosecution of Indian country crimes. In addition to employing their own police forces and judicial staff to respond to criminal activity, the tribes and state routinely detain and convict the same defendant for a single criminal offense. Meanwhile, the federal government plays little or no role. Although the passage of the Kansas Act responded to a perception of lawlessness and a lack of tribal court systems in 1940, the practical realities, seventy years later, no longer require the state to have jurisdiction that intrudes into Indian country in Kansas. This Article poses three possible solutions to remedy the current inefficiencies in the system. First, the authors advocate for a full repeal of the Kansas Act and call upon Congress to restore the same federaltribal criminal jurisdiction model that exists in other states. Second, in the absence of a full repeal, consideration of partial repeal should be explored. Finally, should the Kansas Act remain the law, the tribes and state should consider meaningful cooperative agreements between sovereigns in order to avoid duplicative prosecution and unnecessary expenditure of scarce resources. 
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A. Full Repeal of the Kansas Act
The Kansas Act should be fully repealed because circumstances no longer necessitate the expenditure of state money for prosecutions that are adequately handled by tribal or federal officials. Changes brought by the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 render a tribal-federal jurisdictional framework more practical than the multiple jurisdictional overlap created by the Kansas Act.
Under this model, the U.S. Attorney within the state of Kansas will prosecute Indian country crimes pursuant to the Major Crimes Act and General Crimes Act. At present, federal courts are not hearing Indian country criminal cases in Kansas and the U.S Attorneys' office is not yet exercising its full authority under the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 to prosecute major crimes and interracial crimes occurring in Indian country.
There are no reported federal cases from Kansas and having spoken to tribal prosecutors within the state, the authors are unaware of a single federal charge being brought in the last decade, despite congressional authorization to do so. Under the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, the duties of the U.S. attorneys to actively prosecute Indian country crimes are now highlighted and prioritized. In fact, an Indian country liaison has been appointed in the U.S. Attorneys' Office to fulfill this obligation. Federal authorities in Kansas should no longer rely on the state to carry out its responsibilities in this arena. In this economic climate, with Kansas state courts subject to mandatory court furlough days and other cutbacks, there is no reasonable incentive for the state to continue prosecutions that can be pursued by tribal or federal authorities.
The tribe should assess to what extent, if any, the U.S. Attorney should be engaged to prosecute certain crimes. The Kansas Act creates a situation unique to Kansas by leaving intact inherent tribal jurisdiction, granting jurisdiction to the state but expressly preserving federal jurisdiction over Indian country crimes. There might be times, given investigative and prosecutorial resources, that both the tribe and state would advocate full federal engagement. To date, federal prosecutions have been virtually nonexistent on Indian reservations Kansas, likely due to the fact that the state has traditionally prosecuted coupled with the increased criminal dockets in tribal courts. With the recent passage of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, which prioritizes federal-tribal communication of decisions to prosecute or decline prosecution, the time is ripe for discussion. The model suggested here recognizes that the increased jurisdictional reach of tribal courts makes them capable of handling many prosecutions previously pursued by state authorities. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
Federal prosecutions contemplated by the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 can fill the gap in those circumstances in which limitations imposed upon tribal courts will not fully meet the interests of Native communities. This suggestion is made contemplating that the U.S. Attorneys' Office will continue to decline prosecution when charges by another entity will adequately address the wrong committed by an offense. 209 If so, tribal sovereignty regarding criminal prosecutions will be increased rather than diminished. There may be occasions, however, when a tribe might decline the exercise of prosecutorial powers in favor of federal prosecution. On those occasions, federal authorities are required to step in when the offense involved falls under federal jurisdiction. Even on occasions when a tribe pursues prosecution, federal law enforcement agencies should stand ready to lend their expertise and resources to support tribal prosecutions.
B. Partial Repeal of the Kansas Act
There are two possible partial repeal options, neither of which creates a jurisdictional void in prosecutions. First, the Kansas Act could be repealed on a tribe-by-tribe basis. Meaningful communication and consultation with tribal nations in Kansas should take place to determine whether each tribe opposes or acquiesces to continued state jurisdiction over crimes within the specific reservation. 210 Recall that the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, the state's largest native population, never consented to, and in fact actively opposed, the extension of state jurisdiction onto the reservation.
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Public Law 280, another federal act that provides for limited state jurisdiction over reservations in other states, provides a mechanism for retrocession of jurisdiction to the tribes upon consent of the impacted state. This model has worked well to effectuate a return of exclusive 209. See supra note 144 for discussion of the U.S. Attorneys' "Petite Policy." 210. For instance, the Kansas Act could be repealed as to Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, a tribe that opposed and continues to oppose the Act. In that instance, Jackson County, Kansas would no longer prosecute Indians that commit crimes on that particular reservation. In contrast, however, it might be that another tribe is comfortable with continued state jurisdiction pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding between the state and tribal prosecutors, and the Kansas Act would remain effective for that reservation, with the practical consequences of continued state jurisdiction worked out on the ground on a case by case basis.
211. It may very well be the case that some tribes would support continued state involvement. However, a one-size-fits-all approach in which tribal interests are deemed to be homogenous between different reservations was inappropriate in the 1940s when the Kansas Act was passed and continues to be inappropriate in the current political climate. tribal jurisdiction over some matters. The return of exclusive jurisdiction to the tribes in the Kansas example may easily emulate the Public Law 280 retrocession provisions.
Second, the Kansas Act could be repealed in that non-Indian defendants who commit a crime in Indian country continue to be prosecuted in state court 212 while Indian defendants who commit a crime within Indian country are prosecuted in tribal court. In both instances, the federal government retains the power to prosecute under the Major Crimes Act or the General Crimes Act, leaving intact U.S. attorneys' role as statutorily mandated.
C. Tribal-State Cooperative Agreements
Increasingly, tribes and states are entering into cooperative agreements between sovereigns to accomplish a number of mutually beneficial solutions to practical problems. 213 These agreements address judicial full faith credit concerns, regulatory matters such as foster home licensing, and sharing of resources for infrastructural needs such as road construction and utility access. Cross-jurisdictional law enforcement issues have also been addressed through these types of agreements. The key to their success is that the agreements are entered into on a sovereign-to-sovereign capacity that outlive political appointments or election cycles.
If the Kansas Act is neither repealed nor amended, the authors encourage communication and the consideration of intergovernmental agreements. First, tribes and states may consider agreements such as the recent Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Jackson County Attorney and the Prairie Band Potawatomi Tribal Prosecutor. Under this MOA, the county attorney and the tribal prosecutor agree to work in a cooperative manner to minimize dual prosecutions of a single defendant. 214 The MOA has resulted in better communications between the two prosecutors and operates on the principle of good faith prosecutorial discretion.
With such communication, the relative jurisdictions are somewhat better equipped to make decisions that will 212. Because tribal courts lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, prosecution of nonIndians by the state poses no additional threat to tribal self-governance nor does it create state-tribal dual-prosecution scenarios as described in this Article.
213 positively impact court dockets, financial resources devoted to prosecution and indigent defense systems, and avoid unnecessary duplication. Although a step in the rights direction, an MOA between individual prosecutors only temporarily addresses the issue and provides a band-aid to a much bigger problem and is subject to personnel and political changes. As such, it is not a reliable shield against dual prosecutions and leaves defendants vulnerable to multiple convictions that could have heightened consequences in sentencing on both the state and federal level. The authors advocate that future MOAs have language upon which a defendant can rely on as a bar to subsequent dual prosecution in a single case. Also, the authors advocate that future MOAs be entered into by the relative sovereigns, rather than by individuals.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Kansas Act is no longer relevant. When the legislation was passed in 1940 amidst of narrative of perceived lawlessness on Kansas Indian reservations, Congress presumed that tribal governments would no longer exist and that tribal people would become fully assimilated as state citizens without tribal affiliation. On this premise, the door was opened for a transition to full state authority; however, the transition was never fully realized. In fact, the Kansas Act expressly preserves a federal role in prosecuting Indian country crimes and subsequent federal Indian policy ultimately revived tribal governments and supports tribal selfdetermination. To that end, all tribes in Kansas maintain an active tribal court system with appellate review. As such, the need for the state to shoulder responsibility, both financially and logistically, should be critically reexamined.
Even though no tribal courts existed at the time of enactment, tribal objections to state authority within the reservation boundaries is welldocumented and the perceived jurisdictional gaps were disingenuous given federal statutory authority to prosecute Indian defendants for major crimes and non-Indian defendants for interracial crimes. Further, the state was previously recognized as having authority to prosecute crimes committed in Indian country where the perpetrator and victim were nonIndians. The only actual jurisdiction gap that existed was the prosecution of minor crimes committed by an Indian against another Indian, all matters that are surely within the purview of the modern tribal courts that currently exist.
In addition to the present day relevancy, continuing dual prosecutions by the state and tribes is equally without merit. Currently, the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation tribal courts are fully functioning with a $237,848 annual tribal appropriated budget which includes a three judge court of appeals, a district court judge, two associate district court judges, a special district court judges, a healing to wellness court, a peacemaker tribunal, an employee appeals tribunal, a probation department, a court administrator and three support staff. 215 The budget includes funds for contracts with five public defenders and two additional court appointed attorneys, in addition to the pro bono legal services of Washburn Law Clinic. 216 The tribal court is well-equipped to provide adequate services to its population to the same extent as Kansas county courts. This is particularly true in light of recent cutbacks at the state level.
Nonetheless, the Kansas Act continues to operate on the false assumption that tribes are not equipped to meet the prosecutorial needs of their jurisdiction. At a time when the Kansas state judicial budget is strained, the jurisdictional reach of tribal courts has expanded, and the four tribal nations in Kansas have demonstrated they are capable of administering justice within their borders, there is no reason for the Kansas Act to continue to undercut tribal sovereignty.
